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ABSTRACT 
 Over the past several decades, the law has evolved considerably in the area 
of transgender rights. In this Article, the Authors introduce the legal issues 
surrounding legal change of gender for transsexual individuals, looking to 
current social science, past case law, and general constitutional principles for 
guidance. The Authors also examine the political and practical implications of 
a proposed regime for change of gender petitions for transsexuals in Alaska. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In Alaska, as in many states, courts are seeing an increased number 
of petitions for change of gender.1 These petitions are similar to the 
routine change of name petitions courts have seen for years, yet they 
carry with them a tremendous potential for political controversy.2 At the 
moment, Alaska’s trial courts have little guidance as to how to rule on 
these petitions. As a result, some petitions have been denied outright, 
while others have been considered but with inconsistent legal standards. 
This Article was written with an eye toward helping Alaska’s courts to 
 
 1. Correspondences with the Clerks of Court in Anchorage, Fairbanks, 
Juneau, and Palmer have confirmed that petitions for change of gender have no 
individual CourtView code (CourtView is the case management software used 
by the Alaska Court System), which makes it difficult to pinpoint when change 
of gender petitions first appeared in Alaska courts or how the frequency of 
petitions has changed over time. Informal interviews with Alaska Superior 
Court judges, however, have suggested that although these petitions are still 
relatively infrequent, their numbers have grown in recent years. 
 2. Although these petitions do not appear to be on the political radar at the 
moment in Alaska, transgender rights have been hotly debated in Anchorage in 
the context of whether people should be allowed to discriminate against 
transgendered individuals when making housing and employment decisions. 
See infra Part III.A. Many of the arguments against extending anti-discrimination 
protections to the transgender community express a sentiment at odds with 
granting gender change petitions. See generally http://sosanchorage.com, and 
especially Pastor Prevo’s short opinion piece Any Man Can Put on a Dress and 
Walk into the Ladies’ Restroom, available at www.sosanchorage.com/information/ 
ANY MAN CAN PUT ON A DRESS AND WALK INTO THE LADIES.pdf. If a 
court granted a transgender woman a legal gender change, she would be 
entitled to use a public ladies’ restroom with or without the protections of an 
anti-discrimination ordinance. Therefore, it seems likely that, should gender 
change petitions gain political attention, Pastor Prevo, who has been described 
as the leader of the opposition to the anti-discrimination ordinance, would likely 
oppose such a petition, as would those who share his beliefs. See Megan 
Holland, Gay Rights Measure’s Changes Criticized by Both Sides, ANCHORAGE DAILY 
NEWS, June 18, 2009, at A1. 
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understand the issues behind the controversy, to process the petitions in 
a manner consistent with state precedent, and to explore the practical 
and legal effects of such decisions. 
Most people take for granted the privilege of having legal 
identification that matches the gender that they present to the world. 
When most individuals travel by airplane, purchase alcohol, vote, or 
apply for a job, bank account, or apartment rental, they are not treated 
with mistrust because their identification documents indicate a 
mismatch between the gender they were legally assigned at birth and 
the one they live as an adult. Not everyone shares this privilege. Having 
identification that matches lived gender is “incredibly vital[,] as one’s 
legal gender designation has the potential to impact many areas of life: 
the ability to marry, the ability to travel, the ability to inherit, insurance 
coverage, one’s enrollment in the draft, where one might be 
incarcerated, and more.”3 For many transgender individuals, the only 
way to obtain identification that matches their lived gender is through a 
complete surgical reconstruction of their genitals, which is collectively 
referred to as sexual reassignment surgery (SRS). These surgeries carry 
risks, are expensive, and often require extended recovery periods.4 
The decision each state has to make regarding the procedure for 
obtaining a legal gender change has been and will continue to be 
informed by impassioned stances on both sides of the argument. As 
with any civil rights issue, the debate centers on the pull between 
individual human rights and society’s sense of social stability and order. 
On the one hand, “[i]f a person does not have identification that 
accurately reflects his or her social gender, that person is put in a 
position of potential danger on a daily basis and may be forced to live 
on society’s margins because of an inability to obtain gainful 
employment, credit, or bank accounts.”5 On the other hand, most of us 
view gender as one of the salient categories which we use to structure 
and make sense of our own identities and our interactions with each 
 
 3. Spencer Bergstedt, Estate Planning and the Transgender Client, 30 W. NEW 
ENG. L. REV. 675, 680 (2008). 
 4. See, e.g., Kristin Wenstrom, Comment, “What the Birth Certificate Shows”: 
An Argument To Remove Surgical Requirements from Birth Certificate Amendment 
Policies, 17 TUL. J.L. & SEXUALITY 131, 140–41 (2008) (“These surgeries may be 
prohibitively expensive, some cost over $70,000 and very few medical insurance 
providers cover such surgeries in their plans. . . . Many [choose] not to have 
surgery due to the risks of complications, the painful and extended recovery 
period, and the reduction of erotic sensation. . . . A requirement that an applicant 
have undergone genital surgery is especially burdensome for transgender men. . 
. . A recent study found that only three percent of [female-to-male transsexuals] 
pursue genital surgery due to the costs, limitations of the procedure, as well as 
the medical risks associated with it.”). 
 5. Id. at 681. 
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other. Social categories are only salient, however, to the extent they have 
garnered social consensus. Thus, many people are uncomfortable with 
the fact that gender is not universally perceived as a fixed characteristic. 
For a state to adopt laws that reflect a perception of gender as something 
that is changeable would be to undermine a pillar upon which many 
have constructed their worldview. When the debate is framed in this 
way, it is easy to see why considerable controversy exists regarding the 
rights and liberties of transgender individuals. 
Alaska’s courts and lawmakers will have to decide where they 
stand on the continuum of individual rights. Where to draw the line is 
rarely an easy decision. The public can make its view known through 
voter initiatives and lobbying.6 The Alaskan judiciary, however, is in the 
interesting position of being the interpreter of what is arguably the most 
fiercely individual-rights-protective constitution of any in the United 
States. Alaskan jurisprudence, like the historical sentiment in the state at 
large, has long been “grounded upon such basic values as the 
preservation of maximum individual choice, protection of minority 
sentiments, and appreciation for divergent lifestyles.”7 As this Article 
will show, Alaskan precedent suggests that it is appropriate for courts to 
require some showing of a petitioner’s intention to live permanently as 
the desired gender before approving a change of gender petition.8 That 
precedent further suggests, however, that a requirement of certain 
sexual reassignment surgeries is not an appropriate legal standard for 
Alaskan courts to apply.9 
Over the past several decades, the law has evolved considerably in 
the area of gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgender (GLBT) rights.10 This 
 
 6. See infra Part III.A., regarding the Anchorage Ordinance debate. 
 7. Breese v. Smith, 501 P.2d 159, 169 (Alaska 1972). 
 8. Because gender change petitions have not been directly addressed by the 
Alaska Supreme Court or the United States Supreme Court, Alaska trial courts 
have a substantial amount of discretion in deciding what constitutes proof of 
permanency. This Article strives to outline several approaches being used in the 
United States and abroad, for the purpose of providing a reference for Alaska 
courts. 
 9. There are many surgeries that fall within the category of sexual 
reassignment surgery. Requiring some of those surgeries, such as phallus 
construction for a female-to-male individual, before a change of gender petition 
will be granted, appears to be more punitive than functional. It is the position of 
this Article that Alaskan precedent disfavors the use of such surgeries as a 
barrier to legal gender change. See infra Part IV. 
 10. For the evolution and recognition of civil and constitutional gender 
rights, see such cases as Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (holding that an 
amendment to the Colorado Constitution banning laws that offered protections 
to the GLBT community violated the Equal Protection Clause of the United 
States Constitution); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (holding that the 
Texas statute criminalizing certain intimate sexual conduct between same-sex 
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Article focuses on the specific legal arguments surrounding legal change 
of gender for transsexuals and draws from current social science and 
general constitutional principles for guidance. The courts do not operate 
in a vacuum, so this Article also explores the practical consequences of 
the choices to be made regarding the change of gender issue. 
I.  PETITIONS FOR GENDER CHANGE: AN OVERVIEW 
As the legal rights of the GLBT community evolve in the law, so do 
the recognized rights of transsexual individuals. Many states have 
adopted statutes that allow a person to petition for a change of gender.11 
Alaska, in contrast, does not have any specific statute providing a 
vehicle for official gender change. To show how Alaska’s courts have 
applied the law to transgender Alaskans seeking a court-ordered gender 
modification, this Article follows one Alaskan gender change petitioner, 
to whom the Authors have given the pseudonym “Jane.” 
A. Terminology 
Understanding transgender issues requires some familiarity with 
certain terminology. In our case study, Jane is a transsexual. 
Transsexuals “identify themselves as transgendered.”12 A transgender 
individual expresses his or her gender “in ways incongruous with the 
sex . . . to which [he or she was] assigned at birth.”13 Jane asked for a 
court order changing her gender as part of her transition from male to 
female. 
 
persons violated the federal and state Equal Protection Clauses and the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); and, most recently in Alaska, 
Alaska Civil Liberties Union v. State, 122 P.3d 781 (Alaska 2005) (holding that 
the absolute denial of benefits to public employees with same-sex domestic 
partners was not substantially related to the asserted governmental interests and 
violated the plaintiffs’ right to equal protection under the Alaska Constitution).  
 11. See, e.g., In re Heilig, 816 A.2d 68, 83 (Md. 2003) (“It appears that 22 states 
and the District of Columbia have enacted statutes expressly enabling a person 
who has undergone a change in gender to have his or her birth certificate 
amended to reflect the change.”); Bergstedt, supra note 3, at 682 (“Currently, 
twenty-five states and the District of Columbia authorize an amendment to birth 
certificates by statute.”); Wenstrom, supra note 4, at 132 n.2 (2008) (noting that, 
whether by statute or extension of common law, “[f]orty-eight states allow for 
amendment of the gender designation on the birth certificate.”). 
 12. Jennifer M. Albright, Gender Assessment: A Legal Approach to 
Transsexuality, 55 SMU L. REV. 593, 594 (2002). 
 13. Id. (citing JASON CROMWELL, TRANSMEN & FTMS: IDENTITIES, BODIES, 
GENDERS & SEXUALITIES 23, Univ. of Illinois Press (1999); see also Albright, supra 
note 12, at 594 (“Transsexuals desire to adopt the opposite gender role and bring 
their biological sex in conformity with the adopted gender role.”). 
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The difference between “sex” and “gender” is an important 
distinction when assessing whether a court should order that a person’s 
gender be legally changed. “Sex” often “denotes anatomical or biological 
sex,” while “gender” refers to “a person’s psychosexual individuality or 
identity.”14 
B. Jane’s Story15 
Jane was born anatomically male but has always identified more 
with the female gender. As an adult, she decided to present herself to 
the world as a woman. Because the gender marker on her legal 
documents does not match her lived gender, she has had tremendous 
difficulty with basic activities such as obtaining employment outside of 
the home, and she runs the risk of being accused of fraud, denied 
services, humiliated, attacked, and subjected to harassment.16 
 Alaska’s statute governing amendments to birth certificates is 
ambiguous as to gender amendment procedure,17 but in practice gender 
amendments will be honored when submitted to the Bureau of Vital 
Statistics with a court-ordered gender reassignment.18 Thus, Jane 
petitioned the court for a change of gender order so that she could 
obtain legal identification documents with gender designations 
matching her lived gender. 
Jane has undergone permanent hair removal procedures to her face 
and chest. She took female hormones that resulted in changes to the 
texture of her skin and hair, substantial growth of breast tissue, and a 
redistribution of fat in her body, which had the effect of giving her a 
slimmer waistline. She experienced depression prior to commencing the 
hormone therapy, but her depression decreased during the course of 
hormone treatments. The hormone therapy also caused changes to her 
male genitalia, and she now has little ability to maintain an erection. 
Jane also altered the way she dresses and now lives as a woman full-
time. 
 
 14. Heilig, 816 A.2d at 72 n.4. 
 15. This is an anonymous account of a real person’s story based on a case 
study from an Alaska trial court. 
 16. Wenstrom, supra note 4 at 135–36. 
 17. ALASKA STAT. § 18.50.290. Although the statute governs birth certificate 
amendments generally, it does not address whether gender amendment is 
allowed or what procedure is required. 
 18. See Sources of Authority to Amend Sex Designation on Birth Certificates, 
http://www.lambdalegal.org/our-work/issues/rights-of-transgender-people/ 
sources-of-authority-to-amend.html (last visited Dec. 1, 2009) (“Alaska has a 
general regulation providing for the change of information on birth certificates. 
As with changes of name, changes of sex will be recognized with a court 
order.”). 
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Jane has always considered herself a woman, and her family 
accepts her gender as female. She did marry a woman, years ago, in an 
effort to conform socially to a male role. Jane’s spouse, a biological 
woman, has accepted Jane’s gender as female, and the couple plans to 
remain married. Jane intends to follow through with genital gender 
reassignment surgery once she has saved enough money. Jane was 
diagnosed with Gender Identity Disorder, but has no other evident 
mental health issues. Indeed, her therapist reported that Jane was able to 
operate as a well-adjusted female biologically, socially, and emotionally, 
both at home and in the community. 
II.  A DIVIDED COUNTRY: COMPETING POLICIES 
A. Differing State Policies 
Many states with statutes or regulations for gender amendments to 
birth certificates discuss gender change procedure in the same code or 
regulation that also governs name change procedure.19 Alaska has a 
statute governing birth certificate amendments, and, while it specifies 
name change procedure, it is silent as to gender amendments.20 At least 
twenty-five states and the District of Columbia do have statutory 
schemes for birth certificate amendments, and some states issue 
amended or new birth certificates despite their lack of statutory 
guidelines.21 Of the states that have a gender change petition policy, 
whether by statute or by administrative regulation or policy, nearly all 
require sexual reassignment surgery before granting a petition.22 In fact, 
 
 19. See Bergstedt, supra note 3, at 682 n.3 (recording a list of state statutes 
addressing legal gender change procedure, many of which discuss name change 
procedure as well). 
 20. See ALASKA STAT. § 18.50.290. 
 21. For a compilation of gender change statutes, see Bergstedt, supra note 3, 
at 682 n.3 (“Ala. Code § 22-9A-19(d) (2006); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 36-326(A)(4) 
(2003); Ark. Code Ann. § 20-18-307(d) (2005); Cal. Health & Safety Code § 103425 
(West 2006); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 25-2-1154(4) (2001); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 19a-42(a) 
(2007); D.C. Code Ann. § 7-217(d) (2001); Ga. Code Ann. § 31-10-23(e) (2006); 
Haw. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 338-17.7(a)(4)(B) (LexisNexis 2008); 410 Ill. Comp. Stat. 
535/17(1)(d) (2005); Iowa Code Ann. § 144.23(3) (2005); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 
213.121(5) (West 2007); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 40:62(A) (2001); Md. Code Ann., 
Health-Gen. § 4-214(b)(5) (LexisNexis 2005); Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 46, § 13(e) 
(2006); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 333.2832(1) (West 2001); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 
193.215(9) (West 2004); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 71-604.01 (2003); N.H. Code Admin. R. 
Ann. He-p. §7007.03(e) (2004); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 26:8-40.12 (West 2007); N.M. Stat. 
Ann. § 24-14-25(D) (West 2003); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 130A-118(b)(4) (2007); Or. Rev. 
Stat. § 432.235(4) (2007); Utah Code Ann. § 26-2-11(1) (2007); Va. Code Ann. § 
32.1-269(E) (2004); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 69.15(4)(b) (West 2003).”). 
 22. See id. 
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many states require a petitioner to submit an affidavit from the surgeon 
who performed the surgery to verify that the surgery is complete and 
irreversible.23 
The extent to which individuals are required to undergo surgery 
varies from state to state. Females transitioning to males (FTMs) are 
sometimes able to get a changed birth certificate after either a 
hysterectomy or a male chest reconstruction surgery.24 Breast 
augmentation for males transitioning to females (MTFs) will not satisfy 
the requirement for SRS,25 but in some states the removal of the testicles 
for MTFs may constitute SRS and thus allow for a birth certificate 
amendment.26 Arguably, surgical reassignment requirements are only 
appropriate when the surgeries are desirable and affordable. Many 
transgender people, however, and especially FTMs, decide not to have 
genital surgery because the procedures are cost prohibitive or because 
the result may not be aesthetically pleasing.27 
The way states physically handle birth certificate changes also 
varies. “Some states issue new birth certificates with all the old 
information removed, while some merely amend them by striking out 
the old information and writing the new information in the margins.”28 
Some states do not have settled policy on whether a person may amend 
his or her birth certificate. In South Carolina, for example, there exist no 
ordinances, judicial precedent, or statutes regarding gender amendment 
to the birth certificate.29 A few states have full prohibition on gender 
change for birth certificates.30 Practical realities for immigrants can be 
grim. For them, the change of birth certificates and other government 
documents depends on the regulations of their home country.31 
 
 23. Id. at 682. 
 24. Id. “However, even where a birth certificate has been changed, the 
absence of a phalloplasty or metoidioplasty may be enough to successfully 
challenge the validity of a marriage.” Id. at 682 n.36; see also Kantaras v. 
Kantaras, 884 So. 2d 155 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004); In re Marriage of Simmons, 
825 N.E.2d 303 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005).  
 25. Bergstedt, supra note 3, at 682 n.36. 
 26. Id. 
 27. See Jean Tobin, Against the Surgical Requirement for Change of Legal Sex, 38 
CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 393, 401 (2006–2007) (“Some find the results of available 
surgical techniques unsatisfactory in light of the high cost, painful recovery, and 
risks of complications and diminished sensation. Transsexual men in particular, 
owing to the less advanced state of female-to-male SRS, undergo it much less 
frequently than trans women.”); see also Bergstedt, supra note 3, at 682 (“Many 
FTMs opt not to have genital surgery because of the cost or lack of aesthetic 
quality.”). 
 28. Bergstedt, supra note 3, at 683. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. at 683–84. 
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Courts in other jurisdictions, such as Australia, have called gender 
self-determination a right,32 and the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECHR) has directly pegged gender self-determination as an act within 
an individual’s fundamental right to privacy.33 “[T]he ECHR’s gender 
recognition jurisprudence has emphasized the individual’s ‘freedom to 
define herself [or himself] as a female [or male] person.’ The ECHR 
identifies this freedom as an aspect of the right to private life under the 
European Convention . . . and characterizes it as ‘one of the most basic 
essentials of self-determination.’”34 
B. Heilig, A Guiding Light? 
The Maryland Court of Appeals decision In re Heilig35 is still the 
only example known by the Authors of a court attempting to fashion a 
law for gender change out of general principles of common law, current 
social science, and its state’s incomplete but limiting statute. The Heilig 
court identified seven factors, saying “[t]here is a recognized medical 
viewpoint that gender is not determined by any single criterion, but that 
the following seven factors may be relevant . . . .”36 The seven factors set 
forth are: 
(1) Internal morphologic sex (seminal vesicles/prostate[,] or 
vagina/uterus/fallopian tubes); (2) External morphologic sex 
(genitalia); (3) Gonadal sex (testes or ovaries); (4) Chromosomal 
sex (presence or absence of Y chromosome); (5) Hormonal sex 
(predominance of androgens or estrogens); (6) Phenotypic sex 
(secondary sex characteristics, e.g. facial hair, breasts, body 
type); and (7) Personal sexual identity.37 
The Heilig court operated within the constraints of its own 
legislative guidelines. The Maryland statute that the Heilig court applied 
required a court to issue an order which specifically found that “the sex 
of an individual born in this State has been changed by surgical 
procedure . . . .”38 The court noted that the legislative history for the 
enactment of this statute indicated that the applicant must have had a 
sex change operation.39 However, neither the statutory text nor 
 
 32. See Jean Tobin, supra note 27, at 426. 
 33. Id. at 425. 
 34. Id. 
 35. 816 A.2d 68 (Md. 2003). 
 36. Id. at 73. 
 37. Id. 
 38. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 4-214(b)(5) (2005); see also Heilig, 816 
A.2d at 82. 
 39. Heilig, 816 A.2d at 83. 
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legislative history specified the precise nature or extent of the required 
procedure. 
While limited in its holding by this legislation, the Heilig court 
discussed at length how gender is not merely a function of surgical 
sexual reassignment. The opinion includes a lengthy discussion of the 
social science treatises discussing the aspects of gender identity.40 After 
surveying the field of social science articles, the court summarized: “The 
ultimate conclusion of such studies, which, as noted, is the central point 
sought to be made by transsexuals, is that the preeminent factor in 
determining gender is the individual’s own sexual identity as it has 
developed in the brain.”41 In its conclusion of this survey of the relevant 
treatises, the Heilig court quoted from one study in particular, as follows: 
In the end it is only the children themselves who can and must 
identify who and what they are. It is for us as clinicians and 
researchers to listen and to learn. Clinical decisions must 
ultimately be based not on anatomical predictions, nor on the 
‘correctness’ of sexual function, for this is neither a question of 
morality nor of social consequence, but on that path most 
appropriate to the likeliest psychosexual developmental 
pattern of the child. In other words, the organ that appears to 
be critical to psychosexual development and adaptation is not 
the external genitalia, but the brain.42 
The Heilig court noted that while most states with legislation 
allowing gender change require irreversible surgical procedures, a 
minority of states, including Utah, Virginia, and Wisconsin, do not 
specifically require that any irreversible procedure or surgery be 
undertaken.43 
This discussion is particularly instructive. It suggests that in the 
absence of legal constraints from the legislature or the appellate courts, 
courts need not find all of the Heilig factors in order to acknowledge a 
petitioner’s change of gender. 
C. Applying Heilig to Jane 
With Heilig as a guide, how do the change of gender factors apply 
to Jane? Jane has not undergone sexual reassignment surgery but plans 
to do so as soon as it is economically feasible. She underwent numerous 
 
 40. See generally id. at 71–89. 
 41. Id. at 77. 
 42. Id. (quoting William Reiner, To Be Male or Female—That is the Question, 
151 ARCHIVES PEDIATRIC & ADOLESCENT MED. 224, 225 (1997)). 
 43. Id. at 84 n.8. 
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hormonal and surgical procedures in her transition from male to female. 
She was diagnosed as having Gender Identity Disorder and has 
completed counseling to address how best to live as a woman, despite 
contrary biological realities. 
Because Jane lacks the requisite SRS, she would be denied her 
change of gender petition in most jurisdictions. However, if she were in 
a jurisdiction that applied the Heilig factors, her petition might be 
granted if the last three factors (hormonal sex, phenotypic sex, and 
personal sexual identity) were weighted more significantly than the first 
four factors (internal morphologic sex, external morphologic sex, 
gonadal sex, and chromosomal sex). With respect to hormonal sex 
(criterion five), Jane has undertaken medical procedures to change her 
hormonal sex from male to female. Jane has been taking female 
hormones for two years, and as a result, she no longer can function 
sexually as a male. Jane also now has the secondary sex characteristics to 
satisfy the phenotypic sex criterion (criterion six). She has developed 
breast tissue and a more feminine body shape, and she has undertaken 
multiple laser surgeries to remove hair on her face and chest. Finally, 
Jane satisfies the personal sexual identity criterion (criterion seven) 
because she has personally experienced her gender as female since 
childhood. 
A court, especially one charged with defending a constitution such 
as Alaska’s, could find that these three factors are entitled to 
considerable weight and, in combination, are more relevant to the 
petitioner’s gender than the absence of genital sexual reassignment 
surgery. As this Article will show, the Alaska Constitution includes 
heightened protections for liberty, privacy, and equal treatment under 
the law, all of which appear to be at odds with a requirement of any 
form of SRS that is more punitive than functional. Indeed, Alaska’s 
tradition of preventing governmental interference with individuals’ 
“personal autonomy to control . . . appearance or to direct the course of 
[people’s] lives,”44 may suggest that Alaska courts applying the Heilig 
factors should weigh factors five through seven more heavily by 
grouping factors one through three together as a single consideration 
when petitioners put forth legitimate reasons for avoiding sexual 
reassignment surgery. 
D.  SRS Requirements May Violate Public Policy 
Although the trend in the United States is for states to require 
sexual reassignment surgery before granting gender change 
 
 44. Sampson v. State, 31 P.3d 88, 94 (Alaska 2001). 
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amendments to official documents, there is broad support for granting a 
change of gender petition when the petitioner has not undergone SRS.45 
Put another way, there are several additional reasons why Heilig factors 
five through seven should weigh more significantly than factors one 
through three. The first three factors (internal morphologic sex, external 
morphologic sex, and gonadal sex) all require surgery for transgender 
persons, and some scholars assert that it may be bad policy to encourage 
sexual reassignment surgery.46 These surgeries are expensive, not very 
successful at replicating functional genitalia for FTMs, and, like any 
invasive surgery, carry physical risks.47 
Requiring surgical procedures to obtain a gender amendment 
raises numerous accessibility issues. The cost of surgery and its general 
exclusion from insurance coverage48 precludes numerous transgender 
individuals from obtaining reassignment,49 implicating a potential class 
bias in rules mandating surgical reassignment. The reality that sex-
change operations differ in both their invasiveness and ultimate success 
for transgender men and transgender women suggests that such a 
requirement may be interpreted as a form of sexual discrimination.50 
 
 45. See generally Tobin, supra note 27. 
 46. See id. at 424–29 (“A legal rule with only a very weak basis in public 
policy, or even a wholly irrational one, may go unchallenged if its harmful 
effects are few and slight. The surgical requirement for gender recognition is far 
from harmless. . . . [T]his rule results in unequal treatment and real harm to trans 
individuals’ lives and human rights.”); see also Alice Newlin, Should a Trip from 
Illinois to Tennessee Change a Woman into a Man?: Proposal for a Uniform Interstate 
Sex Reassignment Recognition Act, 17 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 461, 490–92 (2008). 
 47. See Tobin, supra note 27, at 401 (“Some find the results of available 
surgical techniques unsatisfactory in light of the high cost, painful recovery, and 
risks of complications and diminished sensation. Transsexual men in particular, 
owing to the less advanced state of female-to-male SRS, undergo it much less 
frequently than trans women.”); see also Wenstrom, supra note 4, at 140 (“Many 
choose not to have surgery due to the risks of complications, the painful and 
extended recovery period, and the reduction of erotic sensation.”). 
 48. See Wenstrom, supra note 4, at 140 (“These surgeries may be 
prohibitively expensive, some cost over $70,000 and very few medical insurance 
providers cover such surgeries in their plans.”); see also Tobin, supra note 27, at 
400 (“While coverage by public or private health insurance is increasingly the 
norm in Europe . . . in other countries, such as the United States, private insurers 
almost universally deny coverage for SRS.”). 
 49. See Tobin, supra note 27, at 400 (“Others simply cannot afford these 
surgeries, which cost in the tens of thousands of dollars.”). 
 50. “Surgeries for trans men do not result in a penis ‘with the full capacity to 
function sexually as a male’ in the sense of erection, penetration and ejaculation. 
New Zealand’s Family Court cited this differential as one reason for favoring an 
appearance test over a sexual function test. The appearance test seems to have 
the advantage of not operating as a blanket exclusion of trans men. 
Nevertheless, it too may disproportionately exclude trans men, because current 
surgical techniques produce a much greater cosmetic approximation of typical 
genitals for trans women than for trans men. Because it ‘is more advantageous 
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Additionally, disabilities, as well as certain medical conditions and 
personal preferences, may preclude the option of surgery for some 
transgender people.51 These realities have led some scholars and courts 
to find the requirement of sexual reassignment surgery objectionable: 
It is curious, therefore, that the Court appeared to fasten on SRS 
as the threshold of states’ obligation to recognize that freedom. 
Surgical requirements make the enjoyment of this “basic” right 
impossible for individuals with certain medical conditions, as 
well as those who cannot afford these expensive procedures. 
For others, gender recognition will remain out of reach for 
years before SRS can be obtained. The then-Chief Justice of the 
Family Court of Australia has thus criticized the surgical 
requirement (albeit in dicta) as “a cruel and unnecessary 
restriction upon a person’s right to [gender recognition, with] 
little justification on grounds of principle.”52 
Finally, viewing gender self-determination as a right, setting SRS as 
a prerequisite for gender change conflicts with the right to bodily 
integrity: 
Bodily integrity is universally recognized as a fundamental 
human right, protected by national laws and constitutions as 
well as international conventions. It is well established that a 
state violates that right by forcing individuals to undergo 
invasive medical procedures. The state, however, should not 
force an individual to forgo one basic right to enjoy another. 
This is precisely what states do whenever they make surgery a 
prerequisite for gender recognition.53 
 
and burdensome for people seeking legal recognition of their transition from 
female to male rather than male to female,’ Australia’s Family Court has 
suggested in dicta that surgery requirements may operate as ‘a form of indirect 
[sex] discrimination.’” Id. at 424–25. 
 51. “Certain medical reasons such as age, weight, preexisting medical 
conditions, or HIV status may make some treatments unavailable. . . . In 
addition, there are many personal reasons that someone may not undergo 
surgery such as not being able to take time off work, not having support people 
who would be available to help them through the recovery period, or having a 
fear of doctors, hospitals, and/or surgery.” Wenstrom, supra note 4, at 140; see 
also id. at 141 (“A recent study found that only three percent of [female to male 
transsexuals] pursue genital surgery due to the costs, limitations of the 
procedure, as well as the medical risks associated with it. This means that only 
three percent of the trans male population would be eligible for an amended 
birth certificate.”). 
 52. Tobin, supra note 27, at 426 (citation omitted). 
 53. Id. at 427 (citation omitted). 
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The conflict between equality and rights to both bodily integrity 
and gender self-determination, on the one hand, and SRS requirements 
on the other, indicates that such requirements are detrimental to both 
the individual transgender person and society as a whole. 
III.  MAJORITY RULE AND MINORITY RIGHTS 
A. The Current Political Climate in Alaska 
Anchorage has seen its own political debate surrounding, in part, 
the civil rights of transgender individuals. In May 2009, Acting Mayor 
Matt Claman proposed an amendment to the City’s current anti-
discrimination ordinance, at the request of a citizens’ group known as 
Equality Works. The amendment would have added sexual orientation 
to the list of characteristics (already including, among others, race, sex, 
religion, marital status, and age) protected from discrimination in 
employment, education, property sales and rentals, public 
accommodations, and City practices. 
This was the third time in over thirty years that a proposition to 
ban discrimination based on sexual orientation had been up for public 
hearing. More than five hundred people signed up to testify before the 
city council, making the debate “[t]he longest, bitterest argument in 
Anchorage’s social and political experience.”54 
Several drafts of the amendment were presented in an effort to 
obtain a consensus. A central point of the dispute was whether the 
amendment would protect transgender individuals. The first version of 
the amendment provided that the term “sexual orientation” applied to 
transgender individuals.55 This inclusion proved controversial,56 leading 
 
 54. Don Hunter, Gay Rights Go Before Assembly Once Again, ANCHORAGE 
DAILY NEWS, June 7, 2009, at A1. Interestingly, immediately before this round of 
the Anchorage anti-discrimination ordinance debate, Fairbanks saw its own 
debate over the rights of transgender children in the public school system. See 
Joel Davidson, Alaska School District Adds ‘Gender Identity’ to Official Policy, 
CATHOLIC NEWS AGENCY, Mar. 11, 2009, available at http://www. 
catholicnewsagency.com/new.php?n=15340. 
 55. Id. at A6–A7. (“Sexual orientation means actual or perceived 
heterosexuality, homosexuality, bisexuality or gender expression or identity. As 
used in this definition, ‘gender expression or identity’ means having or being 
perceived as having a self-image, appearance, or behavior different from that 
traditionally associated with the sex assigned to that person at birth.”). 
 56. Pastor Prevo announced, “[t]his ordinance actually [empowers] 
transvestites, cross-dressers. It goes to provide protection for what I believe is 
really that aspect of the homosexual movement that probably even the normal 
homosexuals are not proud of.” Don Hunter, Measure Empowers Those Whose 
Behavior Is Extreme, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, June 7, 2009, at A7. “Prevo said he 
would ‘possibly’ consider supporting an amendment if the word ‘sexual 
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the drafters to drop the explicit protection for transgender individuals. 
The Anchorage Daily News reported on the issue, stating: 
Just as the issue did when it arose decades ago, it is bitterly 
dividing the city but has also brought them together for the 
discussion before the Assembly. In line together in the middle 
of the Assembly chambers, waiting for their turns to speak, 
were transgender people standing beside those who likened 
them to pedophiles and miscreants.57 
In August 2009, a version of the amendment was passed by the 
Assembly by a seven to four vote, but then was vetoed by the recently-
elected mayor, Dan Sullivan.58 Ultimately, the amendment failed, as the 
Assembly did not gather the eight votes needed to override the mayor’s 
veto.59 
B. The Role of the Court 
Anchorage’s debate over the proposed anti-discrimination 
ordinance makes clear the political fervor surrounding the rights and 
protections afforded to the transgender community. The public 
controversy, however, simply highlights the need for courts to be 
removed from the will of the majority. Historically, the democratic 
process has often failed to protect minority rights.60 Thus, it has always 
been the responsibility of the courts to defend the liberty of those 
outside of the majority: 
 
orientation’ was removed and in its place was written ‘straight, gay and 
lesbians,’ and if iron-clad exemptions were given to not only religious 
organizations but also religious people.” Megan Holland, Gay Rights Measure’s 
Changes Criticized by Both Sides, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, June 18, 2009, at A1. 
 57. Megan Holland, Battle Lines Drawn—Hearing Continues on Sexual-
orientation Issue that Divides City: Round 2 of the Anti-Discrimination Ordinance 
Debate, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, June 17, 2009, at A1. 
 58. See Don Hunter, Assembly OKs Gay Rights Ordinance 7-4, ANCHORAGE 
DAILY NEWS, Aug. 11, 2009; Don Hunter, Sullivan Vetoes Gay Rights Ordinance, 
ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Aug. 17, 2009. 
 59. See Don Hunter, Assembly Makes No Move To Override Gay Rights Veto, 
ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Aug. 25, 2009. 
 60. Consider the civil rights movement of the 1950s and 1960s. See LAWRENCE 
M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW, 668 (2d ed. 1985) (speculating that 
the Civil Rights Movement would have failed without the intervention of federal 
courts). For a discussion of how direct democracy in particular has failed 
minority rights, see Cody Hoesly, Reforming Direct Democracy: Lessons from 
Oregon, 93 CAL. L. REV. 1191, 1209 (2005) (“When it comes to laws that 
discriminate against minorities, initiatives can easily play to popular prejudices. 
Thus, while initiatives promoting civil rights for minorities generally fail, those 
restricting minority rights often succeed.”). 
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[T]he very purpose of limiting the power of the elected 
branches of government by constitutional provisions like the 
Equal Protection Clause is “to withdraw certain subjects from 
the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond 
the reach of majorities and officials and to establish them as 
legal principles to be applied by the courts.”61 
Similarly, although the framers of the Alaskan and Federal 
Constitutions probably did not have transgender people in mind when 
they drafted the Due Process, Equal Protection, and Privacy (Alaska) 
Clauses, they likely knew that “times can blind us to certain truths and 
later generations can see that laws once thought necessary and proper in 
fact serve only to oppress, and as our constitution endures, persons in 
every generation can invoke its principles in their own search for greater 
freedom and equality.”62 
IV.  THE FEDERAL AND ALASKA CONSTITUTIONS 
Alaska has no statutory scheme addressing change of gender. 
There is no appellate opinion in Alaska that discusses whether such 
relief may be granted. The superior courts maintain broad jurisdiction in 
equity and do thereby possess the inherent authority to consider such 
petitions.63 With guidance from the Alaska and Federal Equal Protection 
Clauses, Alaska’s constitutional right to privacy, the Maryland Court of 
Appeals’ decision in Heilig,64 and a variety of legal and medical treatises 
addressing the topic, some Alaska Superior Courts have held that 
petitioners were entitled to an order recognizing a change of gender. 
 
 61. Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 875 (Iowa 2009) (citing W. Va. State 
Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943)). 
 62. Id. at 876 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Lawrence v. Texas, 
539 U.S. 558, 578–79 (2003) (acknowledging the intent of the Framers of the 
Federal Constitution that the Constitution endure and be interpreted by future 
generations)). 
 63. See Wolff v. Arctic Bowl, Inc., 560 P.2d 758, 770 (Alaska 1977) (“The 
exercise of equitable jurisdiction is a matter of discretion for the trial court.”); see 
also 27 Am. Jur. 2d, Equity § 1 (2009) (“‘Equity’ has been said to be the name of 
the principal or set of principles under which substantial justice may be attained 
in particular cases where the prescribed or customary forms of ordinary law 
seem to be inadequate.”). 
 64. See generally In re Heilig, 816 A.2d 68 (Md. 2003). 
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A. Equal Protection 
Both the Federal and Alaska Constitutions prohibit discrimination 
based on sexual orientation.65 The Supreme Court stated in the 
landmark case of Romer v. Evans that “[a] law declaring that in general it 
shall be more difficult for one group of citizens than for all others to seek 
aid from the government is itself a denial of equal protection of the laws 
in the most literal sense.”66 Because the Alaska Constitution “mandates 
equal treatment of those similarly situated[,] it protects Alaskans’ right 
to non-discriminatory treatment more robustly than does the federal 
equal protection clause.”67 The Alaska Supreme Court has “long 
recognized that [this clause] affords greater protection to individual 
rights than the United States Constitution’s Fourteenth Amendment.”68 
This Article, therefore, will focus on the more broadly protective Equal 
Protection Clause in place in Alaska. 
Alaska applies a three-step, sliding scale test “that places a 
progressively greater or lesser burden on the [S]tate, depending on the 
importance of the individual right affected by the disputed classification 
and the nature of the governmental interest at stake.”69 The first step is 
to identify the group subject to discrimination and determine whether 
there is “disparate treatment of similarly situated persons.”70 
As a transgender individual, Jane is potentially subject to 
discrimination within the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Alaska Constitution. Her request for change of gender touches on two 
equal protection claims: gender discrimination and discrimination based 
on sexual orientation.  
If the court decided to deny Jane’s request for a change of gender, it 
would effectively be denying her right to live in her true gender, 
implicating her right to be free from discrimination based on gender.71 
 
 65. See generally Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996); Alaska Civil Liberties 
Union v. State, 122 P.3d 781 (Alaska 2005). 
 66. Romer, 517 U.S. at 633. 
 67. State Dep’t of Health & Soc. Servs. v. Planned Parenthood of Alaska, Inc., 
28 P.3d 904, 909 (Alaska 2001) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 68. Alaska Civil Liberties Union, 122 P.3d at 785 (citing Alaska Const. art. 1, § 
1); Malabed v. North Slope Borough, 70 P.3d 416, 420 (Alaska 2003). 
 69. Alaska Civil Liberties Union, 122 P.3d at 787 (quoting Malabed, 70 P.3d at 
420–21). 
 70. Id. 
 71. The assertion that transgender persons face harassment and 
discrimination is supported by the brutal fact that the murder rate for 
transgender persons is seven to ten times higher than the national average. 
Wenstrom, supra note 4, at 135 n.11; see also id. at 136 (noting other kinds of 
discrimination transgender individuals often experience when their documented 
gender does not match their lived gender, such as being accused of fraud, 
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As the Maryland Court of Appeals noted in Heilig, “a person has a deep 
personal, social, and economic interest in having the official designation 
of his or her gender match what, in fact, it always was or possibly has 
become.”72 Jane’s right to be free from discrimination based on sex, as 
established by the Alaska Constitution, would be offended if her 
petition was denied, because such denial discriminates against 
individuals who are unable to conform to social expectations attached to 
their lived gender.73 The discrimination can likewise be classified as 
sexual orientation discrimination because disallowing or strictly limiting 
access to gender change is “so closely correlated with being homosexual 
as to make it apparent that such a prohibition targets gay and lesbian 
people as a class.”74 
Having identified Jane’s petition as falling under the auspices of 
Alaska’s Equal Protection Clause, the next step is to examine whether 
the disparate treatment is allowed under a three-step, sliding scale 
analysis.75 
First, it must be determined at the outset what weight should 
be afforded the constitutional interest impaired by the 
challenged enactment. The nature of this interest is the most 
important variable in fixing the appropriate level of review. . . . 
Depending upon the primacy of the interest involved, the state 
will have a greater or lesser burden in justifying its legislation. 
Second, an examination must be undertaken of the purposes 
served by a challenged statute. Depending on the level of 
 
denied services, humiliated, or even attacked). Denying Jane her requested legal 
gender change would serve to further expose her to this discrimination because 
legal documents that display a gender designation at odds with a person’s lived 
gender open the door to targeted harassment. Id. at 135 (“Transgender people 
living outside their birth assigned gender are vulnerable to harassment, 
violence, and discrimination when their gender identity is revealed. A common 
way in which their status is revealed is through incongruent identity 
documents.”). 
 72. In re Heilig, 816 A.2d 68, 79 (Md. 2003). 
 73. ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 3 (“No person is to be denied the enjoyment of 
any civil or political right because of race, color, creed, sex, or national origin. 
The legislature shall implement this section.”). 
 74. See Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 885 (Iowa 2009) (citing Lawrence 
v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 583 (2003)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Iowa 
Supreme Court recently held that restricting marriage to couples composed of 
one man and one woman targeted and discriminated against the GLBT 
community. Similarly, by placing the opportunity to present to the world legally 
as one’s lived gender outside the realistic reach of transgendered men and 
women, a prohibition or strict limitation on gender amendments will 
differentiate “implicitly on the basis of sexual orientation.” Id. 
 75. See Alaska Civil Liberties Union v. State, 122 P.3d 781, 787–89 (Alaska 
2005). 
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review determined, the state may be required to show only that 
its objectives were legitimate, at the low end of the continuum, 
or, at the high end of the scale, that the legislation was 
motivated by a compelling state interest. Third, an evaluation 
of the state’s interest in the particular means employed to 
further its goals must be undertaken. Once again, the state’s 
burden will differ in accordance with the determination of the 
level of scrutiny under the first state of analysis. At the low end 
of the sliding scale, we have held that a substantial relationship 
between means and ends is constitutionally adequate. At the 
higher end of the scale, the fit between means and ends must 
be much closer. If the purpose can be accomplished by a less 
restrictive alternative, the classification will be invalidated.76 
Agencies seeking to prevent change of gender petitions will likely 
use the arguments of cost control and efficiency to attempt to overcome 
the assertions in favor of granting change of gender under the Equal 
Protection Clause. In Alaska Civil Liberties Union v. State, the Alaska 
Supreme Court examined whether the municipality’s denial of same-sex 
partner benefits violated the Equal Protection Clause. The court held 
that while “[t]he governmental interests of cost control, administrative 
efficiency, and promotion of marriage are legitimate . . . the absolute 
denial of benefits to public employees with same-sex domestic partners 
is not substantially related to these governmental interests.”77 
Petitions for change of gender have practical complications. Just as 
the courts consider administrative and practical consequences in cases 
concerning same-sex marriage, Alaska courts will need to weigh the 
practical realities and complications that granting change of gender 
petitions entails. In Alaska Civil Liberties Union, the court considered 
whether same-sex couples were constitutionally entitled to benefits 
programs previously only available to married couples.78 In making this 
determination, the Alaska Supreme Court weighed the three asserted 
governmental interests of “cost control, administrative efficiency, and 
promotion of marriage—in limiting benefits to spouses and dependent 
children.”79 These same interests arise in the context of change of gender 
petitions. Additionally, courts will need to consider the specific 
administrative concerns presented by change of gender. For example, 
issues will likely arise regarding how to treat and house prisoners who 
have a change of gender, how to address the additional administrative 
 
 76. Id. at 789 (citation omitted). 
 77. Id. at 793–94. 
 78. Id. at 783. 
 79. Id. at 790. 
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costs related to change of gender petitions, and how those petitions will 
affect the state’s Marriage Amendment.80 
In a recent decision, Varnum v. Brien,81 the Iowa Supreme Court 
called one’s sexual orientation “central to personal identity.”82 Similarly, 
one’s gender is central to one’s identity. The state would have to 
demonstrate a particular compelling governmental interest to overcome 
one’s right to live in his or her true gender. Looking at the Iowa Court’s 
decision in Varnum, it is unlikely any government interest could be 
compelling enough to overcome the burden required under Alaska’s 
Equal Protection Clause. Notably, living in one’s true gender does not 
require SRS. As a result, a state’s interest in supporting societal gender 
expectations does not require SRS. Jane’s interest in living according to 
her self-identification as a woman, rather than living according to her 
assigned gender, must be given great weight because gender implicates 
so many aspects of her day-to-day life. While there may be legitimate 
governmental interests in efficiently utilizing court resources and 
administrative efficiency in processing change of gender claims, as well 
as in limiting changes to birth certificates and other governmental forms 
of identification, these interests are not sufficiently compelling to 
overcome a person’s essential and fundamental right to live as the 
gender that he or she clearly perceives is correct for him or her. 
Ultimately, the Alaska Supreme Court determined that the 
government’s asserted interests in Alaska Civil Liberties Union did not 
outweigh the rights of same-sex couples under an equal protection 
analysis.83 When considering change of gender legal arguments, 
continued evaluation of the legal and practical realities of allowing 
people to change their gender is warranted. As noted above, granting 
petitions to change gender has the potential to affect regulation of 
marriage (if, for example, a transsexual who changed their gender elects 
to marry a person who lives in the gender the transsexual changed 
from); Department of Corrections housing (for example, housing a 
transsexual whose birth certificate identifies them as one gender while 
they retain the genitalia of the opposite gender); cost control (in the form 
of increased requests for amending documents with governmental 
departments); and administrative efficiency (both in the court system 
and in the departments that make and effectuate the amendments to 
documents). 
 
 80. ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 25. 
 81.  763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009). 
 82. Id. at 907. 
 83. Id. at 893–94. 
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Based on case precedent and the emerging trends in the law, it is 
unlikely that the government would be able to assert an interest 
outweighing the rights of transgender persons. In Varnum, the Iowa 
Supreme Court applied the equal protection test to its marriage 
amendment and held that the state law prohibiting gay marriage was 
unconstitutional, stating that “the language in Iowa Code section 595.2 
limiting civil marriage to a man and a woman must be stricken from the 
statute, and the remaining statutory language must be interpreted and 
applied in a manner allowing gay and lesbian people full access to the 
institution of civil marriage.”84 It further stated that: 
[B]ecause sexual orientation is central to personal identity and 
may be altered [if at all] only at the expense of significant 
damage to the individual’s sense of self, classifications based 
on sexual orientation are no less entitled to consideration as a 
suspect or quasi-suspect class than any other group that has 
been deemed to exhibit an immutable characteristic.85 
Furthermore, “[b]ecause sexual orientation is such an essential 
component of personhood, even if there is some possibility that a 
person’s sexual preference can be altered, it would be wholly 
unacceptable for the state to require anyone to do so.”86 The court 
specifically held that distinguishing between same-sex marriage and 
heterosexual marriage “would be equally suspect and difficult to square 
with the fundamental principles of equal protection embodied in our 
constitution.”87 The court specifically noted a person’s sexual orientation 
is “an essential component of personhood.”88 Similarly, a person’s 
gender is their “psychosexual individuality or identity.”89 The rights of 
personal identity identified in Varnum support the assertion that gender 
is also protected under the Equal Protection Clause. Further, this 
language arguably supports granting change of gender petitions based 
on equal protection rights. 
Similarly, in 1999, the State Supreme Court of Vermont, in Baker v. 
State,90 overturned a law that prevented same-sex couples from enjoying 
the benefits and protections of marriage.91 Using an equal protection 
analysis, the court held that “plaintiffs may not be deprived of the 
 
 84. Id. at 907. 
 85. Id. at 893 (quoting Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 438–
39 (Conn. 2008)). 
 86. Id. at 895 (quoting Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 432). 
 87. Id. at 906. 
 88. Id. at 895. 
 89. In re Heilig, 816 A.2d 68, 72 n.4 (Md. 2003). 
 90. 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999). 
 91. Id. at 867. 
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statutory benefits and protections afforded persons of the opposite sex 
who choose to marry. We hold that the State is constitutionally required 
to extend to same-sex couples the common benefits and protections that 
flow from marriage under Vermont law.”92 The Vermont Supreme Court 
did not go so far as to mandate that the state accept gay marriage. 
Instead, it left the legislature to determine whether and how it would 
regulate the availability of civil unions. Both the Varnum and Baker 
courts found that the Equal Protection Clause protects the rights of 
same-sex couples regarding marriage. The courts underscored that equal 
protection prevents states from treating homosexual and heterosexual 
couples differently when it comes to marriage. Similarly, it is arguable 
that the Equal Protection Clauses of the Federal Constitution and the 
Alaska Constitution prevent Alaska courts from treating transsexuals 
differently than heterosexuals when it comes to living in one’s true 
gender. Further, the cases demonstrate how courts continue to expand 
the scope of protection for members of the GLBT community. 
B. Due Process and Privacy 
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution also provides valuable guidance on the issue 
of granting a change of gender petition. The most instructive federal 
case on this issue is Lawrence v. Texas.93 In Lawrence, the Court 
considered the petition of two homosexual men who were criminally 
prosecuted under Texas sodomy laws.94 The Court characterized the 
issue as “[w]hether petitioners’ criminal convictions for adult 
consensual sexual intimacy in the home violate their vital interests in 
liberty and privacy protected by the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.”95 The Court also acknowledged that “adults 
may choose to enter upon [relationships] in the confines of their homes 
and their own private lives and still retain their dignity as free 
persons.”96 
The Court further stated that this “liberty gives substantial 
protection to adult persons in deciding how to conduct their private 
lives in matters pertaining to sex.”97 This is no less true for Jane. Her 
choice of how to express her gender and associated sexuality is within 
the realm of protection envisioned by the Lawrence Court. 
 
 92. Id. 
 93. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 94. Id. at 563. 
 95. Id. at 564. 
 96. Id. at 567. 
 97. Id. at 572. 
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In its holding, the Lawrence Court specifically addressed the right to 
privacy and the link between liberty and the Due Process Clause, 
stating: 
The petitioners are entitled to respect for their private lives. The 
State cannot demean their existence or control their destiny by 
making their private sexual conduct a crime. Their right to 
liberty under the Due Process Clause gives them the full right 
to engage in their conduct without intervention of the 
government. It is a promise of the Constitution that there is a 
realm of personal liberty which the government may not 
enter.98 
The Court ultimately held that the Texas statute did not further a 
legitimate state interest that could “justify its intrusion into the personal 
and private life of the individual.”99 
One could argue, however, that Lawrence cannot be construed to 
suggest that there is a constitutional duty to require a facile procedure 
for gender amendments to official identification documents. In Lawrence, 
for example, the activity regulated, a sexual act, was unambiguously 
within the realm of private life. Transgender petitioners, on the other 
hand, seek to perform a more public act: changing the gender which 
appears on their official documents. However, the constitutional rights 
implicit in this debate are not necessarily limited to the constraints of 
Lawrence, because the privacy protections afforded in that case are 
magnified by the specific right to privacy in the Alaska Constitution, 
which grants that “[t]he right of the people to privacy is recognized and 
shall not be infringed.”100 The state supreme court has interpreted the 
Privacy Clause as follows: “Because this right to privacy is explicit, its 
protections are necessarily more robust and broader in scope than those 
of the implied federal right to privacy.”101 
 
 98. Id. at 578 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 
847 (1992)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 99. Id. The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) has also upheld 
gender self-determination. Tobin, supra note 27, at 425 (“[T]he ECHR’s gender 
recognition jurisprudence has emphasized the individual’s ‘freedom to define 
herself [or himself] as a female [or male] person.’ The Court identifies this 
freedom as an aspect of the right to private life under the European Convention, 
and characterizes it as ‘one of the most basic essentials of self-determination.’”). 
 100. ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 22. 
 101. State v. Planned Parenthood of Alaska, 171 P.3d 577, 581 (Alaska 2007) 
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494, 514–15 
(Alaska 1975)) (Boochever, J., concurring) (reasoning that “[s]ince the citizens of 
Alaska . . . enacted an amendment to the Alaska Constitution expressly 
providing for a right to privacy not found in the United States Constitution, it 
can only be concluded that that right is broader in scope than that of the Federal 
Constitution.”). 
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Liberty102 and privacy103 in the Alaska Constitution have often been 
analyzed together when addressing questions of personal autonomy.104 
Before the right to privacy was added to the constitution by voter 
initiative in 1972,105 the Alaska Supreme Court, in Breese v. Smith,106 held 
that a student’s right to liberty included the right to express himself by 
wearing long hair. 107 The Breese court stated: 
No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by 
the common law, than the right of every individual to the 
possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint 
or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable 
authority of law. . . . The United States of America, and Alaska 
in particular, reflect a pluralistic society, grounded upon such 
basic values as the preservation of maximum individual choice, 
protection of minority sentiments, and appreciation for 
divergent lifestyles. The spectre of governmental control of the 
physical appearances of private citizens, young and old, is 
antithetical to a free society, contrary to our notions of a 
government of limited powers, and repugnant to the concept of 
personal liberty. It has been observed that [there] are few 
things more personal than one’s body and its appearance, and 
there could be few laws more destructive of the notion that 
there is a range of decision making within which the individual 
is autonomous than a rule regulating physical makeup.108 
The individual autonomy at issue in Breese also applies to the rights 
involved in change of gender: just as the student in Breese had “the right 
‘to be let alone,’”109 so, too, does Jane. If “[n]o right is held more sacred . 
. . than the right of every individual to the possession and control of his 
own person,”110 Jane has the inalienable right to possess and control her 
person. Further, Jane’s request to have her legal documents reflect her 
lived gender is a “personal aspect” of her life “which [has] no direct 
 
 102. ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 1. 
 103. ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 22. 
 104. See, e.g., Sampson v. State, 31 P.3d 88, 90 (Alaska 2001); Ravin v. 
State, 537 P.2d 494, 500 (Alaska 1975) (“In Alaska this court has dealt with the 
concept of privacy on only a few occasions. One of the most significant decisions 
in this area is Breese v. Smith, where we considered the applicability of the 
guarantee of ‘life, liberty, the pursuit of happiness’ found in the Alaska 
Constitution, to a school hairlength [sic] regulation.”) 
 105. Erwin Chemerinsky, Privacy and the Alaska Constitution: Failing to Fulfill 
the Promise, 20 ALASKA L. REV. 29, 30 (2003). 
 106.  501 P.2d 159 (Alaska 1972). 
 107. Id. at 168. 
 108. Id. at 168–69 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
 109. Id. at 171. 
 110. Id. 
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bearing on the ability of others to enjoy their liberty.”111 As such, her 
request appears to be clearly within the scope of liberty defined by the 
Breese court, making a strong argument that her requested gender 
designation is a fundamental and protected right in Alaska. Moreover, 
to deny Jane her right to specify her gender would be to take a position 
antithetical to the Breese court’s recognition that our country as a whole, 
and Alaska in particular, is a “grounded upon such basic values as the 
preservation of maximum individual choice, protection of minority 
sentiments, and appreciation for divergent lifestyles.”112 Jane’s decision 
to live as a woman certainly reflects a minority sentiment and a lifestyle 
divergent from the mainstream. To interfere with her decision by 
denying her the right to present herself to the world as a woman, 
however, would be to erode Alaska’s “basic value” of “maximum 
individual choice.”113 
Any state-required procedure that infringes the right of the 
individual “to the possession and control of his own person, free from 
all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable 
authority of law,”114 must therefore fall short of the Breese precedent. At 
least in Alaska, the law surrounding gender change petitions is not 
“clear and unquestionable.”115 A surgery with such substantial 
drawbacks as SRS, when required in order to have legal documents that 
match one’s lived identity, can be seen as constituting “interference of 
others,” just as it is a “restraint,” on “those personal aspects of our lives 
which have no direct bearing on the ability of others to enjoy their 
liberty.”116 Thus, a requirement of genital reconstruction SRS117 for legal 
gender change appears to be at odds with the protections of the Alaska 
Constitution. 
The case law interpreting Alaska’s specific constitutional right to 
privacy also supports change of gender actions by courts. Sampson v. 
State118 held that neither the right to privacy nor the right to liberty 
include a right to assisted suicide.119 In coming to its conclusion, the 
 
 111. Id. at 168 (quoting Richards v. Thurston, 424 F.2d 1281, 1284–85 (1st Cir. 
1970)). 
 112. Id. at 169. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. at 168. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Most, but not all, of the surgeries considered to be SRS involve genital 
reconstruction. The analysis for chest reconstruction surgery, which is also 
sometimes considered SRS, would be different because the drawbacks to those 
surgeries are not as severe. 
 118.  31 P.3d 88 (Alaska 2001). 
 119. Id. at 95. 
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court summarized the case law interpreting the privacy clause and 
reasoned as follows: 
Valley Hospital [Ass’n v. Mat-Su Coalition for Choice]120, Breese, 
Ravin [v. State]121, and McCracken [v. State]122 collectively set the 
framework for recognizing fundamental rights of personal 
autonomy implicit in our constitution. These cases establish 
that the history and tradition of a right in Alaska are important 
because they help to determine whether the right falls within 
the intention and spirit of our constitution. Moreover, history 
and tradition tend to define our society’s expectations of what 
rights are necessary for civilized life and ordered liberty. All of 
these cases address situations involving personal autonomy to 
control our appearance or to direct the course of our lives; none 
even remotely hints at any historical or legal support for the 
proposition that the general right of personal autonomy 
incorporates a right to physician-assisted suicide.123 
Although the Sampson decision limited the holding of Breese, the 
court made clear that what was at stake in Sampson was fundamentally 
different from what was at stake in the previous cases that interpreted 
the right to privacy and personal liberty.124 The court thus created a 
narrow exception to the traditional interpretation of the constitutional 
protections afforded to issues of personal autonomy regarding control of 
one’s appearance and life direction. 
Jane’s situation does not fall within the narrow exception of 
Sampson. Unlike the petitioners in Sampson, Jane is not seeking an 
exception to a bedrock criminal principle under the authority of the 
Privacy Clause. Also, unlike the asserted right to assisted suicide at issue 
in Sampson, the right to have one’s legal gender follow one’s lived 
gender is an issue directly “involving personal autonomy to control our 
appearance or to direct the course of our lives.”125 
An aspect of appearance is how one holds oneself out to the world. 
Jane is asking that she be allowed to present herself to the world, via her 
legal gender designation, in a manner congruent with her lived identity. 
Moreover, her desire to live in full conformity with the social concepts 
associated with being a woman is clearly a matter involving her ability 
to direct the course of her life. Finally, it is also a matter that affects 
 
 120.  948 P.2d 963 (Alaska 1997). 
 121.  537 P.2d 494 (Alaska 1975). 
 122.  518 P.2d 85 (Alaska 1974). 
 123. Sampson, 31 P.3d at 94. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
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control over her own body, which the Alaska Supreme Court recently 
held to be a “fundamental autonomy.”126 
Thus, the limited holding of Sampson should not preclude 
application of the Breese precedent to the question of what legal standard 
should be used to determine whether a petition for change of gender 
ought to be granted.127 As stated in Sampson, Alaska has a long legal 
history and tradition of protecting people’s right to control their 
appearance and life direction.128 The holdings in Sampson and Breese 
suggest that the constitutional protections of liberty and privacy grant 
Alaskan citizens the right to match their legal gender designation to 
their lived gender without the imposition of any overly burdensome 
preconditions, such as genital sexual reassignment surgery. 
C. Due Process: Liberty and the Right to Employment 
Jane testified that she has experienced difficulty obtaining and 
maintaining employment because her state identification lists her as 
male, yet she presents to the general public as female.129 There is 
evidence that suggests Jane’s troubles are not unique. A recent law 
review article noted that, due to the discrimination faced by transgender 
people, refusing amendment of gender designations on birth certificates 
 
 126. State v. Planned Parenthood of Alaska, 171 P.3d 577, 582 n.28 (Alaska 
2007) (“The dissent appears to liken a minor’s decision of whether to terminate a 
pregnancy to decisions about attending school field trips, joining sports teams, 
viewing ‘R’-rated movies, and lifting weights at the gym. But this analogy 
overlooks the fundamental autonomy at stake in an adolescent’s control over her 
own body.”). 
 127. Indeed, Sampson refers to much of the relevant Breese language when 
explaining the Breese holding, which it did not reject: “We also stated that the 
rights to control personal appearance implicated the important Alaska values of 
the ‘preservation of maximum individual choice, protection of minority 
sentiments, and appreciation for divergent lifestyles,’ as well as ‘notions of a 
government of limited powers.’ . . . We also recounted the importance of 
individual autonomy in Alaskan history.” Sampson, 31 P.3d at 93–94 (citing 
Breese v. Smith, 501 P.2d 159, 169 (Alaska 1972)). 
 128. Id. at 94. 
 129. Driver’s licenses with gender markers that match a person’s lived 
identity are essential to obtaining employment. Although in most places it is 
easier to obtain a reassigned gender on a driver’s license than a birth certificate, 
and generally proof of medical or surgical procedures are not required, there are 
still barriers that prevent many transgender individuals from obtaining 
congruent identification, and thus prevent them from obtaining employment. See 
Bergstedt, supra note 3, at 680–81. Bergstedt also notes that while all fifty states 
and the District of Columbia have some avenue for changing a person’s gender 
on his or her license, some states have a much more daunting process than 
others. Id. at 681 n.30. From Bergstedt’s personal research, the states with the 
most restrictive policies are Georgia, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Mississippi, Missouri, 
Nebraska, Nevada, Ohio, and Tennessee. Id. 
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prevents “transgender people from acquiring congruent identity 
documents that are necessary for obtaining employment, benefits, and 
services.”130 The article further notes that “[transgender] people are 
routinely fired when their gender identity is discovered by their 
employer.”131 
Although the availability of employment is not a fundamental right 
in Alaska sufficient to require strict scrutiny under the United States 
Constitution,132 it is still considered an “important right.”133 It is 
protected under Article I, Section I of the Alaska Constitution, and the 
Fourteenth Amendment of the federal Constitution.134 Without income 
from employment, Jane is financially unable to undergo sexual 
reassignment surgery. If courts were to require surgery as a prerequisite 
to gender amendment, Jane would be in a catch-22, where she could not 
obtain employment because her identity documents would expose her 
to discrimination, but could not amend her identity documents to 
overcome the discrimination and acquire employment because she 
would lack the requisite financial means to do so. 
Protection of citizens’ right to employment requires courts to 
permit state actions135 interfering with personal employment only when 
 
 130. Wenstrom, supra note 4, at 132 (citing Letter from Dean Spade, Founder, 
Sylvia Rivera Legal Resource Program, et al. to Isaac Weisfuse, City of New York 
Dept. of Health (Nov. 18, 2002), available at http://srlp.org/node/93). 
 131. Id. at 133 n.7 (citing Dean Spade, Compliance is Gendered: Struggling for 
Gender Self-Determination in a Hostile Economy, TRANSGENDER RIGHTS 217, 219 
(2006)); see also Bergstedt, supra note 3, at 681 (“If a person does not have 
identification that accurately reflects his or her social gender, that person is put 
in a position of potential danger on a daily basis and may be forced to live on 
society’s margins because of an inability to obtain gainful employment, credit, or 
bank accounts.”). 
 132. Matson v. Alaska Commercial Fisheries Entry Comm’n, 785 P.2d 1200, 
1204 (Alaska 1990). 
 133. Id. at 1205. 
 134. The Alaska Constitution declares that “all persons have a natural right to 
life, liberty, the pursuit of happiness, and the enjoyment of the rewards of their 
own industry . . . .” ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 1. The United States Constitution 
contains a parallel provision. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The U.S. Constitution also 
protects citizens against state deprivations of life, liberty, or property without 
due process of law, and it grants citizens the right to equal protection of the 
laws. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 135. “State Action” is defined as “[a]nything done by a government; esp., in 
constitutional law, an intrusion on a person’s rights (esp. civil rights) either by a 
governmental entity or by a private requirement that can be enforced only by 
governmental action (such as a racially restrictive covenant, which requires 
judicial action for enforcement).” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1444 (8th ed. 2004). 
One could argue that a requirement of SRS for gender amendment to legal 
documents, be it by statute, judicial precedent, or Bureau of Vital Statistics 
policy, is a state action that interferes with personal employment. 
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the interference is “closely related to an important state interest,”136 and 
courts may be hard-pressed to find a state interest that closely relates to 
a policy requiring sexual reassignment surgery prior to a legal gender 
amendment. 
V.  PRACTICAL REALITIES 
A. Transsexuals and Marriage 
The issues surrounding change of gender and transexualism bleed 
into the issues surrounding gay marriage. Those who oppose same-sex 
marriage may view legal gender change as an attempt to circumvent the 
Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA)137 and the state laws and 
constitutional amendments that have sought to preserve a traditional 
notion of marriage.138 
DOMA holds that no state will be required to give full faith and 
credit to any same-sex marriage granted by another state. The Full Faith 
and Credit Clause, on the other hand, allows people to have some 
certainty as to their legal status and responsibilities.139 The country has 
 
 136. Matson, 785 P.2d at 1205 (citing State v. Enserch Alaska Constr., Inc., 787 
P.2d 624, 632 (Alaska, 1989)). 
 137. 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2006). 
 138. See Christine Vestal, Gay Marriage Legal in Six States, STATELINE.ORG (Apr. 
8, 2009), available at http://www.stateline.org/live/details/story?contentId= 
347390 (indicating the thirty states that have constitutional amendments 
prohibiting same-sex marriage and the thirty-six states that have statutes 
prohibiting same-sex marriage). 
 139. The Full Faith and Credit Clause reads as follows: “Full Faith and Credit 
shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings 
of every other State. And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the 
Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the 
Effect thereof.” U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. DOMA, on the other hand, states, “No 
State, territory, or possession of the United States, or Indian tribe, shall be 
required to give effect to any public act, record, or judicial proceeding of any 
other State, territory, possession, or tribe respecting a relationship between 
persons of the same sex that is treated as a marriage under the laws of such other 
State, territory, possession, or tribe, or a right or claim arising from such 
relationship.” 28 U.S.C. § 1738C. Thus, DOMA carves out an exception to the 
expansive rule of full faith and credit. Some have suggested that DOMA is 
unconstitutional because it violates the Full Faith and Credit Clause, and at least 
one court has addressed the issue, holding that DOMA was valid. Wilson v. 
Ake, 354 F.Supp.2d 1298, 1303 (M.D. Fla. 2005) (“Adopting Plaintiffs’ rigid and 
literal interpretation of the Full Faith and Credit Clause would create a license 
for a single State to create national policy.”). For a discussion of the intersection 
of DOMA, full faith and credit, and transgender jurisprudence, see Mark 
Strasser, Marriage, Transsexuals, and the Meaning of Sex: On DOMA, Full Faith and 
Credit, and Statutory Interpretation, 3 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 301 (2003). See 
also Newlin, supra note 46 (“Even when a state does provide a mechanism for 
changing one’s legal sex, the state’s chosen procedure may not be entitled to full 
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faced this issue before, during the period when some states began 
allowing divorces and others did not.140 Problems would clearly arise if, 
for instance, Bill was married to Susan in Kansas, divorced her and 
married Fran in Ohio, and was considered married to Susan in one state, 
to Fran in another, and to no one at all in a third. 
Despite mixed public opinion, the Full Faith and Credit Clause was 
eventually interpreted to require states to respect the findings of divorce 
made by sister states.141 There was political uproar at the time, not 
unlike the current moment’s political storm surrounding same-sex 
marriage. Unless DOMA is rescinded, however, as more states allow 
gay marriage, history is preparing to repeat itself and the country will 
see a great deal of confusion surrounding peoples’ legal status and their 
responsibilities and benefits via their relationships to others. 
Gender change adds another wrinkle to the debate on gay 
marriage. Marriage has been held repeatedly to be a fundamental right 
in the United States.142 Even prisoners have been afforded constitutional 
protection when their right to marriage has been abridged by jailors.143 It 
is unclear, however, who, if anyone, a transsexual is allowed to marry. 
Presumably, when one has changed from a woman to a man in a state 
with no same-sex marriage, his pool of eligible spouses has flipped. 
That, however, has not been the case in this budding area of 
jurisprudence. The Ohio Court of Appeals in In re Marriage License of 
Nash144 affirmed the denial of a marriage license for a transsexual who 
had undergone SRS and obtained an amended birth certificate and 
 
faith and credit in other states. As the law currently stands, Tennessee will not 
recognize a marriage contracted in Illinois between a man and a transgender 
woman, because Tennessee considers this a same-sex marriage.”). 
 140. For a history of U.S. divorce policy and its intersection with the Full Faith 
and Credit Clause, see Ann Laquer Estin, Family Law Federalism: Divorce and the 
Constitution, 16 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 381, 396–406 (2007). 
 141. Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 303–04 (1942); see also 
JUDICIARY: Divorce Wins a Verdict, TIME, Jan. 4, 1943, available at http:// 
www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,790647,00.html (noting that the 
Supreme Court had recently overruled the thirty-seven-year-old precedent 
exempting divorce decrees from full faith and credit, thereby requiring all states 
to recognize divorces granted by other states). 
 142. See Allen E. Shoenberger, Alternative Visions of the Family: The European 
Constitutional Perception of Family Law: Comparison with American Jurisprudence, 18 
TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 419, 440 n.167 (2009) (citing Maynard v. Hill, 
125 U.S. 190, 205, 211 (1888); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 
535, 541 (1942); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 
U.S. 374, 388 (1978)). 
 143. Schoenberger, supra note 142, at 440 (citing Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 
91 (1987)). 
 144. Nos. 2002-T-0149, 2002-T-0179, 2003 WL 23097095 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 
31, 2003). 
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driver’s license.145 Under this outcome, Mr. Nash is not allowed to marry 
anyone. He is legally a man, and his state has since banned same-sex 
marriage,146 so he cannot marry another man; yet the court refuses to 
grant him a marriage license with a woman. Because marriage is a 
fundamental right, this situation presents clear constitutional problems. 
Beyond the considerable due process complications, full faith and 
credit is also likely to be implicated as transgender rights grow. Perhaps 
as states take differing positions on the requirements for legal gender 
change (and marriage availability), Congress will enact another 
exception to the Full Faith and Credit Clause, further contributing to the 
oncoming storm of status confusion. 
Looking abroad, the courts may find guidance from Europe. Not 
only does the European Court of Human Rights require its member 
countries to permit change of gender designations for transgender 
individuals who undergo sex change operations,147 it has gone a step 
further in requiring its countries to allow marriages between a 
transgender individual and a person of his or her original gender.148 This 
protects the right to marry and keeps people’s marital status relatively 
clear. 
B. On the Horizon: REAL ID 
The REAL ID Act of 2005 may make the legal change of gender 
process even more arduous.149 Though the final version of the law leaves 
 
 145. Id. at *1; see also Schoenberger, supra note 142, at 440 (“The major 
exception [to the lack of American judicial opinions regarding transgender 
marriage] is In re Marriage License of Nash, in which an Ohio court affirmed the 
denial of a marriage license, holding that such a marriage was against public 
policy, despite the fact that a number of other American courts have considered 
the validity of such marriages for other purposes such as inheritance, support 
payments, and standing to litigate medical malpractice cases.”). 
 146. OHIO CONST., ART. XV, § 11 (effective Dec. 2, 2004). 
 147. See I v. United Kingdom, (2003) 36 E.H.R.R. 53, P 73; see also 
Shoenberger, supra note 142, at 435–38 for a discussion of ECHR cases dealing 
with transgender issues. 
 148. Schoenberger, supra note 142, at 440 (“The ECHR held in Goodwin v. 
United Kingdom that the United Kingdom’s failure to recognize a marriage 
between a person who had undergone a sex change operation and a person of 
his/her original gender violated Article 8 of the Convention.”) (citing Goodwin 
v. United Kingdom, 35 Eur. H.R. Rep. 18). After the Goodwin decision, the UK 
adopted the Gender Recognition Act (GRA) (2004), which sets the standard for 
what petitioners must show to change their gender designation. See Tobin, supra 
note 27, at 429–34 (discusses the GRA and its rejection of an SRS requirement). 
 149. PUB. L. NO. 109-13, § 202(b), 119 Stat. 231, 311 (2005). The act imposes 
federal security and authentication standards, set by the Department of 
Homeland Security, on driver’s licenses and identification cards. Without an ID 
that meets those federal standards, people will be denied access to federal 
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the issue of gender change to the states,150 the Department of Homeland 
Security will require states to adhere to standardized procedures for 
submitting name and gender changes. In his article Estate Planning and 
the Transgendered Client, Bergstedt hypothesizes that through the 
implementation of REAL ID, “common law name changes will likely 
become obsolete.”151 Similarly, this Act could affect the way in which 
states process change of gender petitions as well. Most significantly, 
immigrants who are required to use passports in order to apply for 
documents covered under REAL ID will most certainly have their 
incongruent gender documents exposed to scrutiny.152 
CONCLUSION 
Alaska’s courts face the task of addressing change of gender 
petitions without the benefit of specific legislative guidelines. As more 
petitions are filed, consistent application of the law will become 
increasingly important. Alaska has heightened constitutional protections 
for privacy, and under the equal protection, due process, and privacy 
analyses, it is likely that courts will continue to grant change of gender 
petitions when petitioners have met requirements that serve to protect 
the stability of gender as a reliable marker of identity. Courts following 
Alaskan precedent, however, are also unlikely to set any restrictions as 
onerous as genital sexual reassignment surgery as a hurdle to legal 
gender change. Case law around the country is trending toward 
protection of GLBT rights. International legal standards are allowing for 
more protections for transgender individuals. Jane, and others like Jane, 
will likely have the liberty to pursue their personal identity with the 
increasing support of legislation and precedent protecting their rights to 
privacy and freedom from discrimination based on sex. Alaska is once 
again well-situated to be a pioneer in another novel yet quickly growing 
field of jurisprudence. 
 
buildings, nuclear power plants, and commercial airplanes. For more 
information, see James J. Fazzalaro, The Real ID Act, Enhanced Drivers’ Licenses, 
and Related Applications Nov. 16, 2007; Dean Spade, Documenting Gender, 59 
HASTINGS L.J. 731, 797–800 (2008). 
 150. Bergstedt, supra note 3, at 688 (citing Eric Resnick, Transgender Concerns 
Ease on Real ID Rules, Just a Bit, GAY PEOPLE’S CHRONICLE.COM, Feb. 1, 2008, 
available at http://www.gaypeopleschronicle.com/stories08/february/0201084. 
htm). 
 151. Id. at 687. 
 152. See id. at 689 (noting that a naturalized U.S. citizen from a country that 
does not amend birth certificates would have trouble changing his or her birth 
certificate and subsequently his or her driver’s license). 
